www.bluerockcapital.com
International Conference on Economic Development Belfast, Northern Ireland May 1996
National business incubation Association — 10th Annual
Meeting New Orleans May 1996
Building a Venture Community from the Ground Up:
A U.S. Case Study in a Regional Market
Terry Collison, Blue Rock Capital, Wilmington, DE, U.S.A.
William A. Scari, Jr., Esq., Pepper Hamilton LLC, Berwyn, PA, U.S.A.
© 1996 by Terry Collison. All rights reserved. May be quoted with proper attribution.
TERRY COLLISON, Partner, Blue Rock Capital, invests in promising seed-stage and early-stage companies from Boston to North Carolina. For Pennsylvania’s Ben Franklin Partnership, Terry serves as a member of the Investment Advisory Board based at Lehigh University. He sits on the Board of the Delaware Innovation Fund, a private-public fund for pre-seed-stage companies. Terry is past-President of the Entrepreneurs' Forum of Greater Philadelphia and the Delaware Entrepreneurs' Forum (which he co-founded). He previously worked in venture programs for General Electric and in a technology joint venture involving Ford and MTI. Blue Rock Capital, Wilmington, DE, USA. Phone 302 426-0981; FAX 302 426-0982; www.bluerockcapital.com
WILLIAM A. SCARI, JR., Esq., Partner, Pepper, Hamilton,
llc, represents corporations, entrepreneurs, and venture capital funds
in a wide array of transactional, counseling, financing, and licensing
matters. Bill is past-President of the Entrepreneurs' Forum of Greater
Philadelphia and is a co-founder of the Delaware Entrepreneurs' Forum.
Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, Berwyn, PA, USA. Phone 610 640-7844; FAX
610 640-7835.
Many communities are intrigued by the idea of creating technology incubator facilities or other forms of support for promising young companies and eager entrepreneurs. But companies and entrepreneurs cannot succeed and prosper in a vacuum. To support the process, other resources — both financial and non-financial — should be created to guide would-be company founders and to help start-ups survive long enough so that they can ultimately stand on their own. This paper documents events in Delaware (a state located in the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States). It provides a ten-year case history which illustrates how the creation of "entrepreneurs’ forums," new venture funding resources for seed-stage investing, spin-off opportunities from large companies, universities, and research institutions, and more enlightened business and government involvement encourages market-based regional economic growth even when other sectors of that economy may be down-sizing, shrinking, or experiencing other types of dislocations. This is a discussion of a ten-year experience that has led to the creation of a venture community in a regional market in the eastern United States. Specifically, this is a report on independent but informally linked activities and resources which encourage and support entrepreneurs and promising young companies in and around Delaware, one of the Mid-Atlantic states in the U.S.
As a basis for this discussion, it is helpful to understand several key terms as they will be used here. Accordingly, working definitions are given below for "economic development," "ventures," "entrepreneurship," "small businesses," and "venture capital."
The heart of this presentation is then devoted to recounting what was known back in the mid-1980s at the start of this effort, the opportunity that was perceived, and the need that seemed apparent. Following this is a discussion of the start-up process, the reaction it engendered, the list of ingredients that seemed required for ultimate success, and the story of how those ingredients were developed, attracted, or otherwise put in place. The presentation concludes with an analysis of what was learned through this process and a description of the situation as it exists today — roughly ten years later. Some of the lessons and insights appear to be applicable to other locations that may be interested in pursuing a related strategy. Certain factors seem to be unique to the time and place and circumstances of this case study. Potentially relevant in a number of diverse settings is the underlying need for increased economic diversity and the energy that can be unleashed through entrepreneurial initiative coupled with judicious but timely funding and other company-building resources.
Defining the key concepts. Here are the key definitions used in this presentation. Because there is a lot of information, perspective, and direct experience packed into these "non-dictionary" definitions, try reading them a bit more slowly than usual. Digesting them one phrase at a time and then, perhaps, even re-reading each one in turn may prove to be helpful. Here they are:
A venture is usually a new company (or a young company... or a small company... or even a "renewed" company)... that recognizes and understands an unmet (or inadequately met) market need... and then provides a distinctive and "compelling" solution... which can be produced at a "low" manufactured cost... and then marketed to "enough" customers... (A) at the right price and (B) fast enough... so that the required internal resources are much, much smaller than the financial return that can ultimately be realized... if, in fact, there is any financial return realized at all.
In the U.S. Venture Capital industry, the term "Venture" has a specialized meaning. A venture is a company (i.e., not just an idea or a technology) that is a true business... which provides proprietary products or specialized services that cannot easily be duplicated... for sale in a high-value (preferably growing) national or international market... in which a significant or dominant market-share.... can be captured at a pricing level that is associated with very high margins and usually eventual profitability, thereby making the company an attractive future I.P.O. candidate or an acquisition target.
To draw the contrast, a "Small Business" is seen as providing proprietary or non-proprietary products or specialized or standard services... which it can sell at a pricing level and within a cost structure that allows the company to capture and preserve a market-share whereby it can sustain itself.
This does not mean that Small Businesses are dumb investments. But it does still mean that venture capital funds do not knowingly invest in companies that will, regardless of their ultimate success and profitability, inherently remain a "small business" according to the above definition.
To round out the picture, it is also important to understand the term "economic development." In its traditional form, "economic development" is known, particularly in the U.S., as "smokestack chasing." Smokestack chasing refers to the process — and generally it is undertaken by a public sector agency — in which one locality responds to a company closing and a loss of local jobs by sending out emissaries to neighboring jurisdictions and "stealing" a company. By tax write-downs and other incentives, the target company is persuaded to relocate to the recently emptied facility. If the company accepts the offer, it creates another newly vacant facility in the jurisdiction it leaves and thereby creates an incentive for that jurisdiction to do a bit of smokestack chasing of its own. Obviously, if this model of economic development runs its course, many, many companies have changed locations, older employees have stayed behind (i.e., the employment roles have shrunk), and the tax base of most jurisdictions may actually decline more than would have occurred if no smokestack chasing had been done at all. Having identified this type of economic development — and the good news here is that there are certainly more enlightened models being practiced also — this paper pretty much turns its attention back to its original focus, namely creating and growing companies rather than stealing them.
But with one more slight detour. To round out the definition of venture capital, above, it is important to understand that in the U.S., the concept of "venture capital" no longer means exactly what it meant in the 1960s and 1970s (effectively, the dawn of institutional venture capital). Because venture capital funds are today generally much larger (often one hundred million dollars or more), it is natural that their investing activities have shifted towards putting money to work in larger chunks. By extension, this often means that such funds invest in larger and therefore later-stage companies than in the early days of venture capital. This is not a universal pattern, to be sure, but it is a consideration that is relevant here as general background.
One consequence is that this shift towards larger, later-stage deals has tended to make it more difficult for promising early-stage ventures to attract the type of true long-term risk capital that they require in order to achieve their objectives.
For the record, venture capital is generally practiced in the U.S. as a private-sector activity. The greatest single source of capital for such funds comes from public sector employee pension funds. Only a small fraction of their overall assets are allocated to this so-called "alternative asset class." The primary objective of the privately-managed venture capital funds is not economic development or to do good works. Their mission is to maximize the financial return for the entities that have provided their investment capital.
There is, therefore, much intersecting interest and activity involving entrepreneurs, venture capital investors, economic development programs, and small businesses. But there is nothing approaching a common view of economic and financial objectives. It is important to be realistic about all of this.
What we knew before we started. This case history reports on the work initiated by a small group of people interested in creating a new venture consciousness and a functioning entrepreneurial community in one particular market. At the outset, here are the seven key insights that were understood and accepted by this ad hoc group of practitioners:
2. For six decades in the U.S. job growth within "small businesses" has more than offset the eroding employment base in big companies.
3. Institutions — especially public agencies — usually try to continue on a course that is familiar to staff and supported by their traditional constituencies.
4. Entrepreneurial know-how isn't automatic. Somehow, entrepreneurs need to learn what to do (and what not to do) and how to be effective.
5. Money isn't the first ingredient in entrepreneurial success. If it comes too soon in the process, it's usually dangerous.
6. Real money is essential sometime. Paper programs, lots of sage advice and extensive mentoring by experienced practitioners, and inspiring speeches about new directions cannot automatically make something happen.
7. Incubator programs by themselves are useful mostly for politicians.
Characteristics of the locale in the mid-1980s. The location where this process unfolded is Delaware. In land-mass, Delaware is the nation's next-to-smallest state and measures a bit more than 150 km. (100+ miles) from north-to-south and perhaps 50 km. (40 miles) east-to-west at its widest point. In the southern end of the state are lovely Atlantic Ocean beach communities (called "the nation's summer capital" because so many Washington area families spend time there). The same area also has a large population of chickens because it is a major poultry raising area. Reflecting the traditional power of legislators from the rural areas, it is said that, in Delaware, "chickens vote."
Delaware is closely associated with three international chemicals companies (ICI, Hercules, and DuPont) and it is home to many members of the duPont family (all at the northern end of the state). Delaware has a university and several colleges, a GM assembly plant and a Chrysler assembly plant, a number of small and medium-sized chemicals companies plus light and medium manufacturers.
The area geographically sits in the midst of the Mid-Atlantic corridor on the east coast of the U.S. (a bit more than one hour by train to either New York City or Washington). The largest city, Wilmington, has now shrunk to under 100,000 people while suburbanization in the surrounding metropolitan area means that it is now home to about 400,000 people. A half hour up the road (and up the Delaware River) is the Philadelphia metropolitan area, the nation's fourth-largest market with 3.5 million people or more. Psychologically, many Delawareans view Philadelphia as a very different place (some even feel uncomfortable going there). Others Delawareans regularly visit Philadelphia for business, ball games, concerts, and restaurants. In Delaware's more densely populated northern end, all local TV comes out of Philadelphia. The radio stations tend to be more evenly located throughout the tri-state market (which includes southern New Jersey and even one nearby county in Maryland). Their listeners are attracted according to the various stations' programming formats and not their locations. Print newspapers is strictly a local-market phenomena. Few Delawareans read Philadelphia papers.
In 1985, the general view the area had of itself was that everything was fine just the way it was and that the future would be an extension of the present. Delaware was celebrating the arrival of a number of so-called "New York banks" which had been attracted to the state by provisions of the recently enacted Financial Center Development Act. It softened state regulations governing interest that could be legally charged to consumers and it provided certain types of regulatory streamlining that made Delaware-based banking operations easier and more attractive. Literally, two dozen new consumer credit operations came into the state. The original Delaware banks extracted a provision that prohibited such banks from competing with local banking services. At the time, this was thought to have virtually no meaningful downside of any nature whatsoever.
The perceived opportunity; and the need. In the 1983, a number of professionals from the larger Philadelphia metropolitan area (the so-called "Delaware Valley region") formed an organization called the Philadelphia Entrepreneurs' Forum. Attorneys, accountants, intellectual patent attorneys, business consultants began meeting once a month with entrepreneurs, company-founders, private investors, and a smattering of venture capitalists. The Philadelphia Entrepreneurs' Forum was loosely patterned after the original MIT Enterprise Forum (still associated with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology). Now called The Entrepreneurs' Forum of Greater Philadelphia, it continues providing a way for people who are working on various venture-type activities to interact around their areas of shared interest.
At the same time, Philadelphia's venture capital community was continuing to grow. Established funds were being joined by new funds and more capital was available to be invested in attractive growing companies. At least in theory.
In 1982, the state of Pennsylvania (where Philadelphia is the largest city) had created an entity known as the Ben Franklin Partnership1. Historically, Pennsylvania's economy had been largely built on mining , the iron and steel industry, the railroads, and other heavy industries that were either in serious decline. As an economic development strategy, smokestack chasing is not effective when the same industries in neighboring states are also going through the same decline. The state of Pennsylvania therefore decided to put up money to fund the commercial "proof-of-concept" for promising research from academic laboratories and other sources in the state. The theory was that once commercial potential could be demonstrated — through scaled-up processes, prototyping, effective manufacturing design, the creation of a business plan, and an operating team — it was then more likely that true institutional venture capital could be obtained to fund a company's full-scale commercialization program. in order to be considered for Ben Franklin Partnership dollars, entrepreneurs were required to find "matching funding." The match could come from family and friends, from private investors, from corporate partners, from "sweat equity" (valued at conservative market rates), donated facilities, equipment, or supplies, or from some combination thereof.
Early Stage Funding
Seed Stage. A relatively small amount of capital is provided to an investor or entrepreneur to prove a specific concept. The funded work may involve product development (as opposed to "pure" research), but it rarely involves initial marketing.
Start-Up Stage. Financing is provided to companies for use in product development and in initial marketing. These companies may be in the process of being organized or may have been in business a short time. In either case, products usually have not yet been sold commercially. Generally, such businesses have assembled key management, have prepared their initial Business Plan, and have conducted at least initial market studies.
First Stage. Financing is provided to companies that have expended their initial capital and now require funds to initiate commercial-scale manufacturing and sales.
Expansion Funding
Second Stage. Working capital is provided for the expansion of a company which is producing and shipping products and which needs to support growing accounts receivable and inventories. Although the company clearly has made progress, it may not yet be showing a profit.
Third Stage. Funds are provided for the major expansion of a company which has increasing sales volume and which is breaking even or which has achieved initial profitability. Funds are utilized for further plant expansion, marketing, and working capital or for development of an improved product, a new technology, or an expanded product line.
Bridge Financing. Financing is provided for a company expected to "go public" within six months to a year. Often bridge financing is structured so that it can be repaid from the proceeds of a public offering. Bridge financing also can involve restructuring of major stockholder positions through secondary transactions. This is done if there are early investors who want to reduce or liquidate their positions. This also might be done following a management change so that the ownership of former management (and relatives or associates) can be purchased prior to the company's going public.
What is the economic development impact
of effective "pre-seed" support?
Ten years ago, Pennsylvania’s General Assembly issued a mandate to strengthen and diversify the state’s economy. In response, the Ben Franklin Partnership program has encouraged strategic partnerships among industry and business leaders, university research experts, investors and entrepreneurs. Together they develop and market new products, improve manufacturing processes, promote new business growth and define Pennsylvania as a leader in technology development. The direct results are seen in manufacturing and technology-based jobs and the number of firms that have been created or expanded.
Dollars: State investment $ 214 million
Matching funds $ 687 million
Employment: Jobs created 13,273 new jobs
Jobs retained 11,490 existing jobs
Development: New companies 824 start-ups
Existing companies 1,030 expansions
Innovations: 540 new products or processes introduced
Multiplier Spin-off work for multiple suppliers and vendors;
Effects: 60% of R&D investment returned to state as
personal and sales taxes within the first year
1982-1991 Impact Report:
Pennsylvania’s Ben Franklin Partnership (1992)
Step 1 — Exploring the Concept. Through a process of informal conversations, it was eventually decided to test whether there might be a sufficient level of opportunity in Delaware to justify establishing a parallel "entrepreneurs' forum" program. Delaware, it was reasoned, had talented mid-career managerial and technical people (people developed by as well as "imported" from other regions by the large chemical companies, among others) plus many latent resources — corporate and institutional capital, a university that must be producing some type of research, lots of unused "shelf" technology at the large companies (DuPont maintained its corporate "Experimental Station" in Wilmington), substantial private wealth, and, perhaps, even more entrepreneurial interest beyond what we had each experienced individually.
To test the hypothesis, seven people came together as the de facto founders of the "Delaware Entrepreneurs' Forum." The founders included Terry Collison, William A. Scari, Jr., Joseph H. Martini, Carl Russell, James G. Kaiser, Carl Hertrich, and Karl Johnston. With initial underwriting from Hertrich's and Johnston's organizations (respectively, KPMG/Peat Marwick and Delaware Trust Company), arrangements were made to invite anybody who was interested to come to an initial meeting of the "Delaware Entrepreneurs' Forum." Participants could network and enjoy hors d'oeuvres and drinks. They would then hear one of the Philadelphia-area venture capitalists present a keynote speech identifying the latent entrepreneurial opportunities apparent in Delaware.
Finding people to invite was simply a matter of the co-founders' culling their respective Rolodexes® for names and then sending out invitations. The local paper was contacted and kindly did a pre-event story for its Business Page.
The announced date was November 15, 1988. The groundrules were simple: the event would be open to anyone who wished to attend, it would be without charge, and the sole requirement was that attendees call a reservations number so that we would have an accurate "nose-count" for the caterer. The co-founders had no idea how many people would actually show up.
To put it in perspective, monthly meetings of the Philadelphia Entrepreneurs' Forum regularly drew 75 to 120 attendees. Since the Philadelphia area has a population of more than 3 million (vs. Greater Wilmington's population of 350,000), we calculated that an audience of "6.6 to 10.5 attendees" would represent a strong showing in Delaware. Twenty-four hours before the Big Day, the guest list included 85 names. Two hours before the event, the number had risen to 125. Once all the names tags had been passed out and the sign-up sheet reviewed, we determined that 188 people were attending the kick-off event.
Virtually all of the banks sent people to see what was going on in their home territory. One bank sent no less than six people.3 It was joked that it was easy to spot the folks from the DuPont Company because they were the ones who declined to wear a name-tag (showing up for an "entrepreneurial" event could be seen as disloyal, confided one DuPonter). But regardless of affiliations, motivation, or level of prior knowledge, the participants agreed that the event had been stimulating . There was unanimous encouragement to make the organization permanent and to continue with a regular program of monthly meetings.
Support. Sponsors from the business, financial, and professional communities were invited. Some became early sponsors while others took a "wait-and-see" position. The state-level Delaware Development Office was invited to join as a charter sponsor (remember that the initiation for the Delaware Entrepreneurs' Forum had come strictly from the private sector). Regrettably, the development office declined invitations initially and for several years thereafter.4
The inaugural Delaware Entrepreneurs' Forum meeting demonstrated a strong indication of untapped and unserved entrepreneurial interest, a small (but sufficient) group of initial sponsors, and a group of individuals willing to serve as officers (and, in effect, as volunteer staff). The hard reality was that there was a pressing need to put together the next program (which would be in January) plus program concepts for the next five or six months thereafter (i.e., through June).
Despite the initial press coverage of the new entrepreneurial activity, the local paper soon lost interest. There was even one period of several years where the paper failed to print meeting notices for the Forum (the Forum ran its own paid notices). The banking and financial community just seemed unable to relate in any way to the new entrepreneurial activities. The university made several attempts to involve itself but ultimately did not pursue formal involvement.5
Programs. The Forum has evolved a very workable format. Meetings generally consist of two parts. Whether held in the morning (7:30 a.m.—9:00 a.m.) or in the afternoon (5:00—7:00 p.m.), the first 30—45 minutes is devoted to an informal networking opportunity in which attendees can circulate and talk with anyone who is there, including the presenters and sponsors (sponsors see this part of the program as an opportunity for "business development" and "relationship-building"). This informal part of the event is then followed by the program presentation. The program is, in turn, followed by an open-ended opportunity for people to "hang around" and chat for as long as they wish (and many do just that).
Throughout the year, the Forums cover a wide range of venture-related issues. Several different formats are used. Meetings consist of the following types of programs:
Topic discussions. Experts address specific topics and venture themes. Topics include, for example, technology transfer, patent law, writing effective business plans, corporate downsizing and entrepreneurial opportunities, franchising, financing, market entry, staffing, and other issues. Attendees are regularly solicited to suggest topics to be considered for a future Forum program.
The "Five-Minute Forum." For the interest of private investors,
entrepreneurs and others in the audience, monthly programs usually start
by giving a promising young company the chance to describe an intriguing
new technology, product concept, or growth opportunity. Audience members
and professional advisors suggest future candidates for the Five-Minute
Forum. Companies are even free to nominate themselves.
Step 2 — Showcasing Success Stories. Nothing sells like success. Accordingly, in the very first year of the Delaware Entrepreneurs' Forum, it was decided that there should be an Annual DEF Venture Fair. Unlike other venture fairs (notably the Mid-Atlantic Venture Fair held in alternating years in Philadelphia and in Baltimore), the DEF Venture Fair would showcase very early-stage companies. The Mid-Atlantic Venture Fair is sponsored by the institutional venture funds (there are now more than three dozen in the region) and it showcases companies that have received one or more rounds of institutional venture capital. The Mid-Atlantic Venture Fair attracts a select group of 500 venture capitalists who pay a hefty conference fee to see two days of presentations by the 50 featured companies.
As a complementary resource, the DEF Venture Fair is intended to showcase companies that are seeking their first round of "outside money." The company might be appropriate for institutional venture capital (this prospect serves as effective "bait" to attract funds as audience-members). Or the company may be appropriate for private investment (thus explaining the presence of those usually difficult-to-identify high net worth individuals in audience at the DEF Venture Fair).
Without such an event, the process for investors to see appropriate early-stage companies is very difficult. It is inherently inefficient because young companies are not particularly visible prior to receiving their first outside investment. The annual DEF Venture Fair provides one of the Mid-Atlantic region’s outstanding opportunities to meet such new companies. The event is the highlight of the annual calendar of programs by the Delaware Entrepreneurs’ Forum. The DEF Venture Fair highlights a select group of 20—30 interesting, competitively selected growth businesses from Delaware and the surrounding region. The companies range from high-tech to no-tech. The selected companies pay a nominal fee to participate. The seats in the audience are open to all without charge and the crowd typically ranges from 300 to 500 people. Because the DEF Venture Fair attracts wide interest and media coverage, the companies that are showcased gain increased visibility plus a special opportunity to promote their products or services as well as their venture concepts.
Since the very first DEF Venture Fair in 1989, winners of each year's event (and many other presenting companies, as well) have subsequently received investment from institutional venture capital funds, from private investors, and through corporate partnerships. DEF Venture Fair companies have also made the Philadelphia 100™, the annual listing of the fastest-growing privately-held companies in the Delaware Valley region. Beginning in 1995, the winner of the DEF Venture Fair was guaranteed a presentation slot at the Mid-Atlantic Venture Fair. Starting just a few months ago, it now appears that an increasing number of young companies have grown to the point where they are even starting to "go public" (i.e., to sell shares of their stock on the public market).
In short, by making the entrepreneurial process tangible, visible, and concrete, the concept of entrepreneurial development and venture investing has become more broadly accepted in this market. In fact, the venture development process is now viewed as an established part of economic activity in the area.
The DEF Venture Fair is presented as "Step 2" in the process. Although there is a critical "Step 3," before discussing this third step, it is important to understand that certain changes had been taking place in the economy of the area.
Situation Up-Date — the 1990s. In the 1980s, recall that the area viewed its economy to be in good shape, extremely stable, and somewhat insulated from the factors that might have an impact on other areas of the U.S. Unlike Pennsylvania, for example, Delaware was not dependent on declining 19th century industries and, in fact, Delaware had been reveling in the arrival of all those new banking operations mentioned earlier. As the 1990s dawned, the Atlantic Ocean beaches were still in place to attract warm weather vacationers to southern Delaware and "chickens still voted."
But suddenly, it seemed, lots of things started to change. Within a period of just a few years (the chronology here is psychological rather than exact), the DuPont Company began a series of corporate "downsizings" that continue even now, Chrysler's future became uncertain (the assembly plant in Delaware might fall under the ax even if the company itself survived), General Motors began threatening to shut down its major assembly plant in Delaware, and even the New York banks entered a period of retrenchment. The brightest spot (in terms of the efforts reported in this paper) was a change in the state government of Delaware. Through a set of circumstances, the new governor appointed as the cabinet-level director of the Delaware Development Office (now the Delaware Economic Development Office) an individual who had formerly been in charge of running Pennsylvania's well-regarded Ben Franklin Partnership. Although someone from out-of-state was not universally welcomed, it was a pivotal event in the continuing story. And it set the stage for "Step 3."
Step 3 — Creating Real Money... and Other Critical Resources. As noted at the outset of this paper, Pennsylvania and other states in the U.S. had already recognized that small amounts of money could help entrepreneurs undertake proof-of-concept work for ventures with true commercial potential. It was seen as money well spent. In the private sector, the DuPont Company even ran an internal "$EED Program." Up to $50,000 was available to any employee who wished to undertake an independent pre-commercial investigation of a technology or business concept that was outside the company's normative businesses. And in the academic community, MIT (the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and other institutions had solid track-records of spinning out academic research and spawning new companies.
In Delaware, it was easy to recognize that there was a need for real money to support the venture potential that was developing. The first logical source was still just one half-hour north in the Philadelphia venture community (there were, by now, two dozen venture funds). As noted, many of them regularly appeared at events sponsored by the Delaware Entrepreneurs' Forum. As part of their own fund-raising efforts, several Philadelphia funds made efforts to attract private, institutional, and corporate investors from Delaware. Despite the substantial capital in Delaware, it would be fair to say that such efforts met with an extremely limited response.
Meanwhile, for seed-stage and pre-seed stage Delaware ventures, there was simply no mechanism at all that was equivalent to the Ben Franklin Partnership and the role it played on behalf of companies in Pennsylvania.
There was an undersupply of venture capital for early-stage companies and a complete lack of capital to support brand-new ventures in Delaware. The larger, later-stage funds in Philadelphia had no physical or psychological presence in Delaware and the Ben Franklin Partnership was prohibited from investing outside the Pennsylvania borders. Given this market situation, there was an initial attempt to raise a new Delaware-based private-sector venture capital fund as early as 1989 (the first year that the DEF Venture Fair proved there was ongoing venture activity). This first attempt was not widely recognized and, to the extent that it had any visibility, it was viewed as an interesting concept — perhaps even as a useful metaphor — but was not accorded much credibility.
It did, however, provide occasion for broader discussion of the issues.
As a result, a second attempt to raise a private-sector fund in Delaware was made in 1992. The effort was continued (or was it resuscitated?) in 1993. Neither of these efforts captured the interest of investors in the local market.
Finally, in 1994, the new director of the state's Delaware Economic Development Office commissioned a "White Paper" to explore whether it made sense to create a Delaware equivalent to Pennsylvania's Ben Franklin Partnership. The assignment was given to someone who had been involved as an advisor to the BFP program since 1985 and who had, at the same time, been working actively with entrepreneurs, company-founders, investors, and the Entrepreneurs' Forums in both Philadelphia and Delaware (he was one of the DEF co-founders). Rather than accepting an assignment to "re-create the BFP program in Delaware," the study's author redefined the question to be: "If Pennsylvania were to recreate its own BFP program today with a clean slate but with the full benefit of its 11 years of experience, what would it do to respond to the special circumstances in Delaware?"
The key insight from the BFP experience is that to succeed requires more than money. Pennsylvania’s BFP program demonstrates that young companies need access to the right amounts of funding on a timely basis plus access to appropriate guidance. Outside counsel can "flag" and help fix problem-areas and it can often identify future problems with long lead times. Unfortunately, the BFP program is extremely limited in its ability to provide such guidance and non-financial resources to its participating companies. The talent is available but the program and its funding are not easily able to make the proper connections.
In Delaware’s situation — where the process of entrepreneurial development is still so new — it was deemed to be critical that the program be conceived and run in a way that would encompass not just funding but true "company-building" activities as well. In addition to financial support for development, it was recognized that fledgling ventures in Delaware might need
• realistic business planning
• effective forecasting and budgeting
• operating support
• help in adding key players
• corporate partnering, O.E.M., or licensing opportunities
• marketing, advertising, promotional or sales planning information, and
• guidance in thinking through the size and timing for required follow-on
investment or debt funding
The result of this "White Paper" was the creation of the Delaware Innovation Fund, a $3 million private-public partnership funded in part with money from the state government in Delaware, in part from a private foundation and, it is hoped, by additional future funding that will come from the private sector and from other sources as the program moves forward.
The Delaware Innovation Fund is governed by a largely private-sector working Board of Directors chaired by a senior manager from the DuPont Company. Once formally constituted, the Delaware Innovation Fund quickly hired a CEO from the private sector and has set about providing Delaware entrepreneurs with small amounts of funding for proof-of-concept work ($10,000-25,000) and larger amounts (up to $150,000 per year) for commercialization and roll-out. Like the BFP program, matching funding is required as part of "real-world" validation of the potential.
To date, the Delaware Innovation Fund has awarded funding for an independently developed advanced materials company, a technology that is being released by DuPont to a former employee, a proprietary services business that is partnering with a major U.S. merchandiser, and several others. At this writing, the Delaware Innovation Fund has just celebrated its first anniversary.
Delaware Venture Partners is a complementary resource that came into existence in 1995. Delaware Venture partners is an association between two Baltimore venture capital funds. These funds were competitively selected by Delaware's state government to receive an initial $1.6 million investment commitment that would then help attract investment commitments by Delaware banks6and corporations. With strong support from the governor's office, $10.5 million in investment commitments were, in fact, obtained and this new $12.1 million entity established an office in the state. The principals associated with the two collaborating funds have become active participants in the Delaware Entrepreneurs' Forum and have been working hard to find deals in Delaware to invest their funds.
As a final step, a third fund called Blue Rock Capital was raised independently. Based in Delaware and focused on early-stage investing in the Mid-Atlantic region (Boston to North Carolina), Blue Rock Capital has attracted institutional investors, high net worth individuals and families plus other sophisticated investors from throughout its own region and other parts of the U.S. as well. This fund has a capital investment capability that is approaching $50 million (it is still raising capital).
Taking stock. Here is the situation today. In addition to increasingly knowledgeable legal, accounting, intellectual property, and consulting professionals, Delaware now boasts a number of programs and organizations that are focused on the entrepreneurial and venture community in all its manifestations (i.e., not just on sophisticated technology-based ventures). For example, at a recent monthly meeting of the Delaware Entrepreneurs' Forum, the topic was "Tapping into Delaware's 'Hidden' Entrepreneurial Resources." The following issues were posed:
• How can you get information about competition in the market-niche that your company is targeting with its new product?
• Where can you network with other entrepreneurs, young companies, private investors, and venture capital funds?
• How can you find "exploratory" money to develop your new product?
• In terms of a reality check, how can you initially determine whether your venture idea is a bona fide marketing opportunity or a pipe dream?
• When you truly need debt funding from a bank, how should you go about doing that?
• And when you know for certain that your particular situation does not match any bank’s program for lending (it’s too early, too small, too much market risk, etc.), where can you turn for funding and what is involved in going after it?
• the Small Business Development Center and SBDC’s "Inventors Mean Business" program
• the Senior Core of Retired Executives or SCORE
• the Women’s Center for Economic Options
• Working Capital Delaware and the First State Community Loan Fund (micro-loans beginning at $500 for first-time entrepreneurs working in support groups of other entrepreneurs).
• the Delaware Entrepreneurs’ Forum itself
• Delaware Innovation Fund
• Delaware Venture Partners
• Blue Rock Capital
What makes entrepreneuring and venturing relevant now? As the 20th century draws to a close, the U.S. economy is characterized by many types of internal changes at companies, restructuring at all levels, corporate downsizing, the continuing closure of many "old-line" companies, and ongoing mergers and acquisitions. Under different ownership or management, even established companies are attempting to deal with new corporate objectives, changing organizational cultures, and unfamiliar or non-traditional working styles or work procedures. "Local" companies may no longer, in fact, be "local" at all.
Both technology diffusion and competitive patterns are increasingly "internationalized." The idea of a job-for-life (even working for the same company in a series of assignments) is now, effectively, a thing of the past. So is the idea of being trained early in life and then using that training to advance through a trade or professional career. Estimates for people graduating today are that they will each go through something like a half dozen major re-training periods during their working lifetimes.
Collectively, these factors raise significant questions about the job options for mid-career employees. When someone is "down-sized," what are his or her employment options going to be? What other large company is hiring mid-career employees? If someone voluntarily leaves to pursue "greener pastures," what will his or her work options be? Similarly, what choices will be open to today's graduates at those estimated half-dozen "significant" changes of course during their working years?
It is these factors which represent part of the reason why entrepreneuring and venturing have been assuming increased importance in both the private sector and the public sector. The actions set forth in this paper chronicle the effort in one part of the U.S. to use entrepreneuring and venturing to respond to a changing economy and to the grass-roots desire of many individual entrepreneurs to create new companies targeted at emerging and growing markets.
What did we learn? Earlier, this paper inventoried what some of the key people in Delaware's fledgling venture community thought they knew at the beginning. It seems only fair, therefore, that this paper conclude with a review of what those same people would acknowledge that they know now.
The first observation is that although they themselves were interested in entrepreneurial development, this did not guarantee that everyone else in the community would be interested. In short, bright new "ideas" are not always welcome. For that matter, all the talk about venture development and entrepreneuring was, in some quarters, not viewed initially as an important element of economic activity. Some of the reactions seemed downright hostile. From others, there was general indifference. On the other hand, entrepreneurs and potential entrepreneurs were intrigued that a source of information was now making itself evident.
Because old patterns proved resistant to change, it soon became apparent that new models and alliances would have to be created. Some of this could be accomplished within existing institutions and firms (finding the right person was important). Other steps had to wait on changes that could not be effected directly in any way (for example, a change in administration in the state government allowed fresh thinking into a key agency).
From hindsight, the process has depended on only a few leaders. They absolutely had to stick with the effort. And yet it was recognized from the start that the Delaware Entrepreneurs' Forum should not become the province of a single individual. The succession process was intentionally designed to bring new people into the process of governance. This has been important. Having said this, it is also realistic to note that many of the original founders remain personally involved even now, some ten years later. Many have brought in others from their respective organizations to carry out the continuing commitment of their organizations as sponsors of the Forum.
A corollary of "It takes only a few committed people" is the second line of the couplet which goes "And lots and lots of out-reach." By comparing the list of sponsoring organizations for the early years of the Delaware Entrepreneurs' Forum with the current roster, it is instantly apparent that the community's involvement and support is now much broader. In some cases, the involvement of certain organizations and entities represents a full 180° turn-around. It is delightful to recognize almost the full community's coming together in this program (only one sector still remains wholly unrepresented as a sponsor).
Here are the final four thoughts that grow out of the experience that is reported here:
2. The entrepreneur's secret ingredient. Creating programs to create new ventures may work for research institutions and for corporations. But this strategy is not well-suited for community-level programs. The kind of process described here works instead to create entrepreneurs because it is entrepreneurs who create ventures and then apply "I-will-walk-through-walls" energy to make them succeed.
3. Probability theory. It will be normal to encounter lots of frustrations along the way. But it is also likely that you will encounter "windows of opportunity" too. Watch for lucky breaks and be prepared to respond to them on a very timely basis. At first, you may not recognize them for what they are. Or could be turned into. Keep your thinking cap on.
4. Why would anyone really do this? Be prepared to share the credit for success. Even the people who fail to contribute very much (even some who prove obstructionist) may later rush to get in the photograph or to be interviewed by the newspaper. Success has many parents. That's not such a bad thing. But don't even think about tackling this sort of project in your own region if you have an ego that needs constant stroking. Your ego is likely to end up decidedly unstroked. Get your kicks because you may be able to help bring something important into existence that just wasn't there before. And after all, isn't that the essence of acting entrepreneurially?
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